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Abstract
In this paper, we study the eect of conventional interest rate policy, quantitative easing
and the reserve accounts’ interest rate on the money stock in an industrial-organization
model of the banking industry with money creation. Our main ndings are as follows.
First, under a plausible setting of the parameters, the model with money creation supports
the liquidity puzzle, in which tight monetary policy increases the money stock. Second,
quantitative monetary easing has a similar eect. Third, the negative interest rate policy
on reserves has a negative eect on the money stock.
JEL classication: E51, E52, G21.
1 Introduction
Since the 2000s, many central banks have conducted unconventional monetary policy. In par-
ticular, the Bank of Japan, the Federal Reserve Bank and the Bank of England adopted Quan-
titative Easing (QE), where the central bank purchased bonds to lower interest rates and/or
increase the monetary base. Recently, the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan set a
negative interest rate on reserve accounts. This is called Negative Interest Rate Policy (NIRP).
In this paper, we use an industrial-organization model of the banking industry to approach
the eect of conventional interest rate policy, QE, and NIRP on the money stock. In his seminal
paper, Klein (1971) introduced an industrial-organizational model of the banking sector called
the Monti{Klein model. Because it is quite tractable, many researchers have used this model:
Pringle (1973), Towey (1974), Miller (1975), Dermine (1986), and Freixas and Rochet (2008).
However, there is no research that studies the eects of conventional interest rate policy, QE,
and NIRP on the money stock in the Monti{Klein model.
In their seminal work, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011) use DSGE
models with nancial intermediaries to show that QE plays an important role in the prevention
of nancial turmoil. In their model, nancial intermediaries secure nance from households that
they then provide as loans to rms. However, their models do not consider money creation.
In fact, banks actually provide loans to both households and rms while taking deposits from
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them at the same time. Banks do not need any resources to lend money. We now introduce
money creation into our model to investigate the eect of monetary policy.
Our main contributions are as follows. First, the Monti{Klein model with money creation
can give rise to the liquidity puzzle under a particular condition. When banks face an increase
in money market interest rates, they nance their lending from an alternative instrument, i.e.,
deposits. Therefore, the money stock, which includes deposits, increases. Monetary theory
suggests that a rise in the interest rate caused by monetary policy decreases the money stock.
However, most of the empirical studies report the inverse of this, that is, a positive correlation
between interest rates and the money stock. This is called the liquidity puzzle. A large number
of researchers tried to resolve this puzzle by using alternative empirical methods.1 Strongin
(1995) and Christiano et al. (1996) nd that, in general, a narrower denition of the money
stock removes the puzzle. Moreover, Kelly et al. (2011) suggests that measurement error plays
an important role in the liquidity puzzle. However, few theoretical studies capture the puzzle.
Second, we show that quantitative monetary easing in the Monti{Klein model has a similar
eect. The condition under which the liquidity puzzle is observed in the model with quantitative
easing is similar to that in the model with conventional monetary policy. In both cases, the
liquidity eect depends on the ratio of borrowers' deposits to their loans.
Third, interest rates on reserves have a positive eect on the money stock. Because the
interest on reserves benets not only deposits but also loans to the banking sector, a rise in the
rates on reserves increases the money stock, which consists of both deposits and loans. However,
negative interest rates on reserves, as implemented by the Bank of Japan, has a negative eect
on the money stock.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we introduce the conventional
Monti{Klein model to study the eect of monetary policy on the money stock. We then intro-
duce money creation and show that under a certain condition, the model with money creation
results in the liquidity eect. In Sections 3 and 4, we consider the eect of quantitative easing
and the interest rate on reserves, respectively. In the nal section, we conclude.
2 The eect of the money market interest rate
2.1 The Monti{Klein model
Suppose that there are N banks in this economy. They supply loans, Li, and money market
lending, Mi, while they borrow from deposits, Di (i = 1; : : : ; N). Bank i maximizes its prots
i(Li;Mi; Di) = rl(L)Li + rMi   rd(D)Di; (1)
subject to the balance sheet
Li +Mi + Di = Di; (2)
where rl(L) is the interest rate on loans as the inverse demand function for loans (r
0
l < 0), rd(D)
is the interest rate on deposits as the inverse supply function for deposits (r0d > 0), r is the
rate on the money market as an instrument of monetary policy, and  is the ratio of reserves
to deposits. Because there are non-bank nancial institutions, the sum of Mi is not necessarily
zero.  consists of not only the reserve requirement rate but also other demands for central
bank deposits, because in some countries, e.g., the UK, there is no reserve requirement on bank
deposits, but commercial banks are willing to demand reserves in order to settle inter-bank
transactions. So, we assume  2 (0; 1]. The left-hand side of this equation presents the asset
1For earlier studies, see Melvin (1983) and Leeper and Gordon (1992).
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side: bank loans, money market lending and reserves, while the right-hand side means the debt
side. Combining these equations, we have
i(Li; Di) = [rl(L)  r]Li + [r(1  )  rd(D)]Di: (3)
For the non-banking sector that includes households and rms, we assume the inverse demand
function for loans and the inverse supply function for deposits is
rl(L) = al   blL and rd(D) = ad + bdD; (4)
where al; bl; ad; bd > 0, L =
PN
i=1 Li, and D =
PN
i=1Di. From the rst order conditions, we
obtain the Cournot{Nash equilibrium,
Li =
al   r
(N + 1)bl
and Di =
r(1  )  ad
(N + 1)bd
; (5)
for i = 1; : : : ; N . The eects of the money market interest rate are2
@Li
@r
=   1
(N + 1)bl
and
@Di
@r
=
1  
(N + 1)bd
: (6)
This model implicitly assumes that banks provide their loans L as cash because bank loans
do not correspond to their liabilities, i.e., deposits, in the balance sheet. As we will study in
the next subsection, in practice, if banks lend to rms and households, a part of Li corresponds
to the deposits. However, the conventional banking sector model does not consider such a
situation. Therefore, the money stock in this economy consists of cash (loans) and deposits,
M s = L+D =
NX
i=1
(Li +Di): (7)
In equilibrium, the eect of the money market interest rate on the money stock is
@M s
@r
=
N
N + 1

1  
bd
  1
bl

: (8)
Proposition 1 In the Monti{Klein model, the eect of the money market interest rates on the
money stock is
@M s
@r
8><>:
> 0 if blbd >
1
1 
= 0 if blbd =
1
1 
< 0 otherwise.
(9)
This result can explain the liquidity puzzle. Standard monetary theory, e.g., the IS-LM
model, neoclassical growth model with money-in-the-utility or cash-in-advance constraint and so
on, suggests that a tight monetary policy decreases the money stock. However, many empirical
studies report the opposite eect, especially for broad money. In the Monti{Klein model, a
rise in money market interest rates leads to an incentive of banks to lend to the open market,
nancing these loans from deposits. Therefore, if bl=bd > 1=(1   ), a tight monetary policy
increases the money stock.
In fact, however, depositors do not react so much to a change in deposit rates, whereas
borrowers react strongly to a change in lending rates. That is, bd is probably greater than bl.
If so, bl=bd is relatively small. Therefore, in this model, it is likely that an increase in money
market rates decreases the money stock.
2Individual bank loans Li decrease as N increases. However, aggregate bank loans, L =
PN
i=1 Li, increase as
N increases. This is partly consistent with the empirical fact shown by Gunji et al. (2009).
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2.2 The Monti{Klein model with money creation
As shown in the previous section, the Monti{Klein model can demonstrate the liquidity puzzle.
However, the result depends on bl=bd, which is usually small in practice. Moreover, borrowers
do not, in fact, withdraw their deposits very much. To resolve the shortcomings of the model
in the previous subsection, we introduce money creation into the model.
We divide deposits into saving accounts, D0i, and checking accounts, Dli. The prot of bank
i is
i = rl(L)Li + rMi   rd(D0)D0i: (10)
where Di = D0i +Dli is the total deposits of bank i and D0 =
PN
i=1D0i. The balance sheet of
bank i is
Li +Mi + 
0D0i = D0i +Dli: (11)
In this case, the reserve ratio 0 is not identied, because banks can choose both 0 and the
amount of the saving deposit D0i. Therefore, banks face the other constraint 
0D0i = (D0i +
Dli), in which banks choose 
0 and D0i so as to satisfy their demand for reserves (D0i +Dli).
This constraint yields
Li +Mi + (D0i +Dli) = D0i +Dli: (12)
Banks lend to borrowers as checking accounts and borrowers partly draw down their account,
that is,
Dli = iLi; (13)
where i 2 [0; 1] is the ratio of checking accounts to loans and 1  i is the ratio of withdrawals
from deposits, i.e. cash, to loans. Banks may provide their loans to a number of borrowers,
which individually withdraw dierent amounts of cash from their deposits. At the same time,
the borrowers earn revenue and repay the banks. Consequently, i averaged among borrowers
would usually be positive. In practice, i is close to one in the modern economy. For simplicity,
we assume that all banks face the same i condition, that is, i =  for all i. It is important
to note that banks can make loans without the central bank's injections from the monetary
base because banks are required to nance Li, which can be satised, for example, as checking
accounts of Li and saving accounts of (1   )Li. In other words, money creation does not
initially require base money.
Substituting (13) into (12), we obtain
Mi = (1  )D0i   [1  (1  )]Li: (14)
The second term of the right-hand side implies that to lend Li dollars, bank i has to borrow
1   (1   ) dollars from the money market, instead of Li dollars, because the remainder of
checking accounts (1  )Dli is also available for loans. So the optimization problem of bank i
is to maximize
i = frl(L)  r[1  (1  )]gLi + [r(1  )  rd(D0)]D0i: (15)
From the rst order conditions, we obtain
Li =
al   r[1  (1  )]
(N + 1)bl
and D0i =
r(1  )  ad
(N + 1)bd
: (16)
In this economy, bank loans are greater by r(1 )=(N +1)bl than in the Monti{Klein model.
Because total deposits are saving accounts plus checking accounts,
Di = D0i +Dli = D0i + Li: (17)
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The eect of the money market interest rate on bank loans is
@Li
@r
=  1  (1  )
(N + 1)bl
: (18)
This derivative consists of two terms. The rst is the same as the Monti{Klein model,  1=(N+
1)bl, in which a rise in r increases the nancing cost from the money market. The second is
caused by money creation, in which a rise in r increases interest earnings by lending checking
accounts to the money market, that is (1 )=(N +1)bl. Therefore, with money creation, the
eect of money market interest rates on bank loans is equal to or smaller than that without
money creation.
On the other hand, the eect of the money market interest rate on total deposits is
@Di
@r
=
@D0i
@r
+ 
@Li
@r
=
1  
(N + 1)bd
  [1  (1  )]
(N + 1)bl
: (19)
This suggests that @Di=@r in the model with money creation is not only smaller than that
without money creation, but can also still be positive under a certain condition.
Lemma 1 In the Monti{Klein model with money creation, the eect of money market interest
rates on bank loans is negative and (i) if bl=bd > 1=[4(1   )2], then @Di=@r > 0. (ii) If
bl=bd = 1=[4(1  )2], then @Di=@r  0. (iii) If bl=bd < 1=[4(1  )2], then
@Di
@r
8><>:
> 0 if 0   <  or  <   1;
= 0 if  =  or  = ;
< 0 if  <  < ;
(20)
where  =
bd 
p
bd[bd 4(1 )2bl]
2(1 )bd and  =
bd+
p
bd[bd 4(1 )2bl]
2(1 )bd .
Proof. Equation (19) depends on . Dene f() = (1   )=bd   (1=bl) + [(1   )=bl]2. The
discriminant of f() = 0 is  = 1=b2l   4(1  )2=(blbd). Since f 00() = 2(1  )=bl > 0,  < 0
, f() > 0 and  = 0 , f()  0. I  > 0, then f() = 0 has two roots,  and . 
Figure 1 shows an example of this result. The parameters are set to be N = 10,  = 0:01,
bd = 1, and bl = f2; 0:2551; 0:1g, where 1=[4(1   )2] ' 0:2551. The vertical axis is @Di=@r
and the horizontal axis is . In the case of  = 0, which corresponds to the Monti{Klein model
without money creation, the eect of r is always positive. However, as  approaches 0:2551,
the eect decreases. The reason is that higher  leads to a rise in bank loans and increases the
eect of r on Li that has a negative sign. On the other hand, it rises as  goes from 0:2551 to
unity, because a rise in  brings about an increase in checking accounts, D0, and yields more
earnings from the money market.
In this economy, the money stock consists of cash currency and deposit currency,
M s = (1  )
NX
i=1
Li| {z }
cash currency
+
NX
i=1
(D0i + Li)| {z }
deposit currency
= D0 + L: (21)
It is important to note that in this economy, cash and checking deposits are created by loans.
As a result, we dene the money stock as consisting of saving deposits and loans, but also
including cash. Therefore, we obtain the eect of the short-term interest rate on the money
stock,
@M s
@r
=   N
N + 1

1  (1  )
bl
  1  
bd

: (22)
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Proposition 2 In the Monti{Klein model with money creation, the eect of money market
interest rates on the money stock is
@M s
@r
8><>:
> 0 if blbd >
1 (1 )
1 
= 0 if blbd =
1 (1 )
1 
< 0 otherwise.
(23)
Figure 2 demonstrates the impact of money-market interest rates on the money stock. In
the case of the solid line, where the slope of the interest rate curve on loans, bl, is relatively
greater than that on deposits, bd, the eect of the money market rate on the money stock is
positive in spite of . However, as the ratio of bl to bd decreases, the eect is reected in .
Therefore, the liquidity puzzle is observed when the ratio, bl=bd is suciently large. Suppose,
on the other hand, that if  is suciently large, e.g.,  = 1. Then, the right-hand side of the
condition in Proposition 2 becomes =(1   ). In practice,  is quite small, so is =(1   ).
For example, when  = 0:01, we obtain =(1 ) ' 0:01. In this case, the model generates the
liquidity puzzle unless bl=bd is close to zero.
The reason is that with money creation, a rise in the money market interest rate induces
banks to decrease loans and the eect is large when the slope of the interest rate curve for loans
bl is small. Hence, the liquidity eect depends on the indirect eect of r on L.
2.3 Calibrating 
The liquidity eect in the Monti{Klein model critically depends on the ratio of the deposits of
borrowers to loans, . The money stock consists of cash currency and deposit currency, which
are related to bank loans. Therefore, it is important to investigate how the borrowers withdraw
or leave their deposits. In this section, we calibrate  from the data.
By denition, we obtain  = Dl=L, but Dl is not the same as actual checking accounts
data. Although Dl is provided when banks lend L to borrowers, we cannot identify how much
deposits rise with an increase of bank loans. Therefore, we calibrate  using an alternative
method. First, we dene the ratio of loans to deposits, 0  L=D, and, because D = D0 + L,
we have
 =
L  0D0
0L
:
Second, the money multiplier is dened as 1  M s=M b. From the denitions of M s and M b,
we obtain
D0 =
1   1
1  1L 
1  
1  1L1:
Therefore, we have
 =
(1  1)=0   0(1   1)
1  1   (1  )01 :
We use Japanese data from the website of the Bank of Japan to estimate . The sample period
is from 2003 to 2014. The monetary base is M b, M3 is M s, the amount of loans of domestic
banks is L, and the amount of deposits of domestic banks is D.
The result is shown in Figure 3. Although the estimate of  moves around 0.85, it falls
sharply in 2013, when the Bank of Japan introduced Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary
Easing (QQE). Therefore, in the period of conventional monetary policy,  is quite high. This
implies that in the normal period, the liquidity period is prone to be observed.
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3 Quantitative monetary easing and the interest rate on reserve
accounts in the Monti{Klein model
If the money market rate of interest reaches the zero lower bound, the central bank cannot
decrease the rate anymore. Alternatively, some central banks have purchased long-term gov-
ernment bonds and/or other risky bonds from the nancial market in order to aect the yield
curve directly. This is called quantitative monetary easing. In this section, we study the eects
of bond purchases by the central bank using the model with money creation.
The central bank can also use interest on reserve balances as an instrument of monetary
policy. In particular, the Bank of Japan has conducted a NIRP, which is a negative rate of
interest on excess reserve balances, since February 2016. However, the eect is not well known.
So, in this section, we use the Monti{Klein model to investigate the eect of the interest rate
on reserve balances. Because the model without money creation has a similar result to that
below, we present only the model with money creation.
For simplicity, we ignore money market lending and introduce bonds into the model. The
prot of bank i is
i = rl(L)Li + rb(B)Bi   rd(D0)D0i + rCB(D0i +Dli): (24)
where B = BCB +
PN
i=1Bi, Bi is the bond holdings of bank i = 1; : : : ; N or the central bank
i = CB, rb(B) is the yield of bonds, and rCB is the interest rate on reserves. Although in
practice, the Bank of Japan applies NIRP only on excess reserves, we assume for simplicity that
the interest rate applies to total reserves. We assume the bond yield is
rb(B) = ab   bbB; (25)
where ab; bb > 0. The central bank rst purchases bonds from non-bank institutions and pays
into the reserves of a bank that holds the institutions' deposit accounts. This operation leads
to increases both in the asset side (reserves) and in the liability side (deposits of non-bank
institutions) of the bank balance sheet. The balance sheet of bank i is
Li +Bi + D0i +RNi = D0i +Dli +DNi;
where DNi = BCB is new deposits that non-bank institutions obtain by selling their bonds to
the central bank and RNi = BCB is new reserves. Therefore, it has no eect on the constraint
of banks and we have3
Li +Bi + (D0i +Dli) = D0i +Dli: (26)
Substituting (13) into (26), we obtain
Bi = (1  )D0i   [1  (1  )]Li: (27)
The rst order conditions are
Li =
1
20
  1
2
X
j 6=i
Lj +
2
20
(D0i +D0); (28)
D0i =
	1
2	0
  1
2
X
j 6=i
D0j +
2
2	0
(Li + L): (29)
3This assumption means that banks hold excess reserves. Even if, however, banks do not hold any excess
reserves, that is, reserves= (D0i +Dli +DNi), we obtain exactly the same condition as Proposition 3.
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where
0 = bl + bb[1  (1  )]2; (30)
1 = al   (ab   bbBCB)[1  (1  )] + rCB; (31)
2 = bb(1  )[1  (1  )]; (32)
	0 = bd + bb(1  )2; (33)
	1 = [ab   bbBCB](1  )  ad + rCB: (34)
From these conditions, we have
Li =
1	0 +2	1
(N + 1)[0	0   (2)2] ; (35)
D0i =
0	1 +12
(N + 1)[0	0   (2)2] : (36)
Proposition 3 In the Monti{Klein model with money creation, the eect of purchasing bonds
by the central bank on the money stock is
@M s
@BCB
8><>:
< 0 if blbd >
1 (1 )
1 
= 0 if blbd =
1 (1 )
1 
> 0 otherwise.
(37)
Proof. See the Appendix.
From the Appendix, the eects of quantitative monetary easing on the money stock is
@M s
@BCB
=
N
N + 1

1  (1  )
bl
  1  
bd

1
bb
+
[1  (1  )]2
bl
+
(1  )2
bd
 1
: (38)
This formula is similar to Eq. (22) except for the second term in the reciprocal. Figure 4
demonstrates Eq. (38). We set bb = 2 and the other parameters are the same as those in
the previous section. In general, a rise in BCB decreases its interest rate bb, but does not
necessarily increase M s. As shown in the previous subsection, the smaller the ratio bl=bd, the
greater @M s=@BCB. If, however,  is suciently large, the derivative tends to be negative, that
is, monetary policy easing decreases the money stock.
Next, we consider the eect of interest on reserves. The eect of the interest rate on reserve
accounts is
@Li
@rCB
=

(N + 1)[0	0   (2)2] and
@D0i
@rCB
=

(N + 1)[0	0   (2)2] : (39)
Therefore, we obtain the eect of rCB on the money stock,
@M s
@rCB
=
N
N + 1
(1 + )
0	0   (2)2 : (40)
Proposition 4 In the Monti{Klein model, the eect of the interest rate on reserve balances on
the money stock is positive.
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That is, NIRP decreases bank loans, deposits, and the money stock. The reason is that
if the central bank reduces the interest rate on reserves, ceteris paribus, the cost of new bank
loans increases because new loans create new deposits and requires new reserves. On the other
hand, the sign of the eect of rCB on B is ambiguous. The sign is positive (negative) if the
eect of rCB on D0i (Li) matters.
Is this eect stronger when the banking industry is more competitive? Mr. Haruhiko Kuroda,
the Governer of the Bank of Japan, says:
In fact, given the erce competition in Japan's lending market, banks are unlikely
to increase lending rates to oset the rise in costs through the negative interest rate
policy. (March 7, 2016)
However, our model suggests
0 >
drl
dL
@L
@rCB

N=1
>
drl
dL
@L
@rCB

N!1
:
In other words, the more competitive the banking industry, the higher the lending rates is from
the eect of NIRP. This is because banks in a competitive market produce, that is, lend, more
than those in a less competitive market. Hence, erce competition among banks would lead to
a tighter monetary policy for the economy.
4 Concluding remarks
We have studied monetary policy in the Monti{Klein model. The liquidity eect in the model
with money creation depends on the ratio of the deposits of borrowers to their loans, . Under a
certain condition, the model can yield the liquidity puzzle. This result is the same in the model
with quantitative monetary easing: While the eect of the central bank's bond purchase on the
money stock is positive in the normal model, the eect depends on  in the model with money
creation. Therefore, the liquidity puzzle is observed when  is relatively high. On the other
hand, the interest on reserves increases the money stock because it is an incentive for obtaining
new deposits, which can be created by bank loans.
As you may notice, our study is of a partial equilibrium model. In our model, there is no
interaction between loans, money market lending, and deposits, except the channel through the
banking industry. This is a crucial limitation in our model. So, an important future task is to
extend our model to a general equilibrium model.
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 3
The eects of purchasing bonds by the central bank on bank loans and deposits are
@Li
@BCB
=
bb[1  (1  )]	0   2bb(1  )
(N + 1)[0	0   (2)2] ; (41)
@D0i
@BCB
=
2bb[1  (1  )]  0bb(1  )
(N + 1)[0	0   (2)2] : (42)
The sign of the denominator, which is the same in both derivatives, is positive because
0	0   (2)2 = blbd + blbb(1  )2 + bbbd[1  (1  )]2 > 0: (43)
On the other hand, the numerators are
bb[1  (1  )]	0   2bb(1  ) = bdbb[1  (1  )] > 0; (44)
2bb[1  (1  )]  0bb(1  ) =  blbb(1  ) < 0: (45)
Therefore, @Li=@BCB > 0 and @D0i=@BCB < 0. Because the money stock in this economy is
M s =
PN
i=1(D0i + Li), we obtain
sgn

@M s
@BCB

= sgn (bd[1  (1  )]  bl(1  )) : (46)
Hence, if (46) is positive, then @M s=@BCB is also positive. 
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Figure 1: The impact of interest rate on deposits versus the ratio of checking accounts to loans
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Figure 2: The impact of the interest rate on the money stock versus the ratio of checking
accounts to loans
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Figure 3: Calibrated theta
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Figure 4: The impact of the central bank's bond purchasing on the money stock versus the
ratio of checking accounts to loans
15
